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28 
DAVIS AND HAMMON:  
A STEP FORWARD, OR A STEP BACK? 
By Tom Lininger*† 
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington 
and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on 
testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. 
The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed 
Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court 
strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial 
hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and devel-
oped a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but the Court did not 
attempt to explain all the implications of Crawford. In fact, the Davis ruling 
raised nearly as many questions as it answered.  
This Essay will begin by noting some shortcomings of the Davis opin-
ion. I will then highlight what I regard as salutary aspects of this ruling. The 
next section will list some of the questions that remain unanswered in the 
wake of Davis. I will conclude by suggesting that the Davis ruling is a step 
forward—albeit a modest one—for confrontation jurisprudence. 
I. What’s Troubling about DAVIS 
One of the most urgent concerns after Crawford was to create a more 
predictable test for distinguishing testimonial hearsay from nontestimonial 
hearsay. The Davis opinion made only limited progress on this front, estab-
lishing a new test that deems statements nontestimonial if elicited by law 
enforcement officers responding to an ongoing emergency. Because the term 
“ongoing emergency” is susceptible to many different interpretations, this 
test may give lower courts the flexibility to reach varying outcomes based 
on notions of expediency rather than doctrinal consistency. In fact, one 
might argue that the line of cases extending from Ohio v. Roberts to Craw-
ford to Davis has not reduced ambiguity, but has only relocated the 
ambiguity from the term “reliable” (in Roberts) to the term “testimonial” (in 
Crawford) to the term “ongoing emergency” (in Davis).  
Another shortcoming of the Davis opinion is its focus on the intent of 
the police rather than the intent of the declarant. The Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right to confront witnesses 
against him. In Crawford, the Supreme Court explained that an out-of-court 
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declarant could be a “witness” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause if 
the declarant is essentially testifying against the accused. Within Crawford’s 
framework, the testimonial character of the declarant’s statement depended 
more on the declarant’s mindset than on the intention of the interlocutor. 
Crawford essentially posed this question: would a reasonable person in the 
position of the declarant foresee the prosecutorial use of his or her state-
ment? In Davis, the Supreme Court has now shifted the focus from the 
declarant to the police eliciting the statement. The doctrinal drift from 
Crawford to Davis is all the more perplexing given that the two opinions 
share the same author, Justice Antonin Scalia. 
An additional problem posed by Davis is the necessity to discern the 
“primary motive” of the officer who questions the hearsay declarant. If the 
primary motive is to gather evidence of past crimes, the statement will likely 
be testimonial. If the primary motive is to respond to an ongoing emergency, 
the statement may very well be nontestimonial. In many cases, officers will 
have dual motives, especially where it is unclear whether a crime has ended 
or the emergency is ongoing. Untangling dual motivation has proven diffi-
cult in other contexts. For example, in the context of traffic stops, the courts 
wrestled for decades with the challenge of dual motivation, until the Su-
preme Court finally decided in Whren v. United States that “pretextual 
stops” are permissible if one of the dual motives is to enforce a minor traffic 
law. The effort to sort out the motives of officers questioning witnesses at an 
apparent crime scene will likely be difficult as well. The Supreme Court has 
falsely posited the mutual exclusivity of the motive to investigate and the 
motive to rescue, and because police do not neatly compartmentalize their 
motivations, the Davis test could prove difficult to apply. 
Will the Davis test invite manipulation by police? As they have in re-
sponse to the Supreme Court’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, 
police will likely try to adapt their practices so that they can accomplish the 
same goals by simply incanting the right rationale for their actions. For ex-
ample, police will probably be much more careful in their reports to list 
circumstances supporting an inference of “ongoing emergency” at the time 
the police question hearsay declarants. However, the use of an objective, 
rather than subjective, standard in Davis will minimize the ability of police 
to manipulate this test. Ultimately, the characterization of a statement as 
testimonial or nontestimonial will depend on a circumstance over which the 
officers exercise no control: the pendency of an emergency. The temporal 
boundary will be plain in many cases, especially when the alleged assailant 
is no longer at the scene. Concerns about manipulation of the Davis test may 
be overblown. 
Davis is objectionable for another reason: its abdication of any constitu-
tional regulation in the context of nontestimonial hearsay. In Crawford, the 
Court had implied that the Confrontation Clause only applies to testimonial 
hearsay. In Davis, the Court made this point emphatically. Apparently the 
Court is content to leave nontestimonial hearsay to statutory regulation—or 
to the regulation of state constitutions, in those few states that grant the ac-
cused greater confrontation rights than does the federal Constitution. After 
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Davis, some lower courts may continue to apply the Roberts framework to 
nontestimonial hearsay (as they did in the wake of Crawford), and some 
lower courts may simply dispense with any consideration of constitutional 
confrontation rights. This result seems curious indeed, given Justice Scalia’s 
emphasis on both the teleological and deontological importance of confron-
tation. The great rift between the regulation of testimonial hearsay and the 
regulation of nontestimonial hearsay may lead some courts to err on the side 
of classifying hearsay as testimonial, lest they deprive defendants of any 
confrontation rights.  
II. The Bright Side 
The Davis ruling deserves praise for many reasons. To begin with, the 
Supreme Court rejected alternative tests that would have been much worse 
than the test actually adopted in Davis. Some lower courts had ruled that 
excited utterances are nontestimonial per se, on the ground that an agitated 
declarant cannot possibly contemplate the prosecutorial use of that decla-
rant’s statements. If adopted by the Supreme Court, such a rule would have 
gutted the Confrontation Clause. At the other extreme, a rule that classified 
all statements to police as per se testimonial would have been overbroad, 
and would have overlooked the fact that some declarants are not “testifying” 
when they interact with law enforcement officers. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Davis did brighten the line somewhat be-
tween testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay. Certainly the Court brought 
greater clarity to the review of 911 calls. If the emergency has not yet 
abated, these calls will be deemed nontestimonial. Most courts of appeal 
had already reached the same conclusion before the Davis ruling, but the 
Supreme Court’s endorsement of this conclusion will improve the predict-
ability of outcomes in lower courts. As to statements made by hearsay 
declarants to responding officers, the clarity of the line between testimonial 
and nontestimonial hearsay now depends on a distinction between past and 
ongoing crimes—a distinction that is doctrinally straightforward, if perhaps 
somewhat difficult to apply in particular cases. 
The focus in Davis on police motives is theoretically inconsistent with 
Crawford, but there may be some practical benefit to the Davis approach. 
For example, the Davis ruling reduces the possibility that police will ques-
tion declarants for investigative purposes at a time when declarants are so 
distraught that they are not contemplating prosecutorial use of their state-
ments. The Davis ruling may help to standardize the treatment of adult and 
child witnesses. Under Davis, police cannot contrive circumstances in which 
a plain-clothes interlocutor speaks with a child for investigative purposes: 
while the child in this circumstance may not believe that he or she is provid-
ing information for prosecutorial use, the intent of the government agent is 
dispositive. (Crawford should have dictated the same result in such a case, 
but Davis makes the right answer even more clear). 
The Supreme Court’s continued enthusiasm for the doctrine of forfeiture 
presents intriguing possibilities. In domestic violence cases, batterers some-
LININGER  IMPRESSIONS FTP.DOC 8/3/2006 10:23 AM 
2006] A Step Forward, or a Step Back? 31 
 
times threaten retaliation if their victims testify in court. The Supreme Court 
emphasized in Davis that the defendant who wrongfully procures the ab-
sence of the accuser at trial may not be heard to protest the admission of the 
accuser’s hearsay statements. The precise contours of the forfeiture doctrine 
require some further clarification, but the Supreme Court has definitely 
spurred the development of this doctrine by including such strong language 
in the Davis ruling. 
Davis also deserves adulation for unshackling confrontation jurispru-
dence from the rigid originalist interpretation in the Crawford ruling. Two 
years ago, Justice Scalia’s fealty to the Framers’ intent raised concerns that 
confrontation jurisprudence might not adapt to the new circumstances of the 
twenty-first century. In Davis, Justice Scalia backed away from his strict 
originalist interpretation in Crawford, and even chided Justice Thomas’s 
dissent for undue emphasis on the Framers’ historical circumstances. 
I admire Davis for one final reason. This case has provided an excellent 
“teachable moment” for evidence professors. Some of the brightest lights in 
academia advocated for the parties or the amici in Davis. The briefs filed by 
these advocates are a terrific resource for students who wish to understand 
not only the rules of evidence and the parameters of the Confrontation 
Clause, but also the underlying policy concerns. My students at the Univer-
sity of Oregon mooted the oral argument in Davis, and I was impressed by 
the cogency of both sides’ arguments. This case does not present the perfect 
equipoise of a NITA hypothetical, but it does provide ample ammunition for 
both sides.  
III. Unresolved Questions 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court did not set out in Davis to clear up 
all the mysteries of modern confrontation jurisprudence, so it is not surpris-
ing that several questions remain. One category of unresolved questions 
relates to the definition of “testimonial” hearsay. Just how can police—or 
judges, for that matter—determine precisely when an emergency has ended? 
How will the courts respond when police claim that they are simultaneously 
investigating and responding to an emergency? What will happen when a 
hearsay declarant believes that an emergency is continuing, but the respond-
ing officers do not share this belief? Outside the context of interrogation, 
when will a hearsay statement to a police officer qualify as testimonial hear-
say? How should courts determine the testimonial or nontestimonial 
character of a statement when police send the alleged victim to speak with a 
counselor or medical professional? 
A second category of unresolved questions concerns the forfeiture doc-
trine. To what extent does Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) frame—or at 
least guide the interpretation of—the constitutional forfeiture doctrine? Is a 
subjective intent to prevent trial testimony necessary to effect forfeiture, or 
is it sufficient for the wrongdoer to commit intentionally an act that inciden-
tally causes the unavailability of the declarant? Once the prosecution has 
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proven forfeiture, what is the scope of admissible hearsay? Can the absent 
declarant be impeached to the same extent as an ordinary hearsay declarant? 
Conclusion 
History may not remember Davis as a watershed case. Certainly, Davis 
did not alter the landscape of evidence law to the same extent as Crawford. 
But if evaluated for its incremental value in clarifying the meaning of the 
term “testimonial,” the Davis ruling is commendable. By illuminating the 
distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay, the Supreme 
Court has helped prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial judges adapt to the 
post-Crawford world. I congratulate the law professors who did such fine 
work in Davis, including Richard Friedman at Michigan, Joan Meier at 
George Washington, and Jeff Fisher, who will begin teaching at Stanford 
this coming fall. 
